Abstract: Many scholars accept the important role international organizations (IOs) play in facilitating cooperation among states in world politics, yet there is disagreement about the theoretical mechanisms that best account for the positive correlation between shared IO memberships and cooperation. Institutionalists and Rationalists treat state preferences as fixed and emphasize the influence of IO memberships on interstate bargaining. In this view, IOs act as constraints, because while they help states negotiate more efficiently (with fewer costs & greater information), they do not significantly alter states' preferences. Constructivists, on the other hand, recognize that organizations can alter member states' identities and interests, and that long and deep commitments to international organizations can have constitutive effects on member states' preferences and behavior. In this paper, I derive several hypotheses about the constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on member state behavior from existing theoretical arguments in the IR literature and evaluate these claims empirically using data on contentious issues from the Issue Correlates of War Project. Empirical analyses show that while shared IO memberships (frequency and duration) neither prevent the onset of new contentious issues nor promote more frequent peaceful settlement attempts, they do decrease the use of militarized force and produce more successful negotiation attempts. Disputants are much more likely to reach and comply with agreements to end contentious issue claims when they share more frequent and durable memberships in international organizations.
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The growth in the number and influence of global and regional international organizations over the past century has been staggering. Since 1909, the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) increased from 37 to over 6400 and the number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) grew from 176 to over 44,000 (http://www.uia.org/uiastats/ytb199.htm).
Social scientists and policy makers disagree about how much influence these regional and global organizations wield over countries' behavior and interstate interactions. This disagreement is apparent when we consider the variation in theoretical arguments relating institutions to cooperation, ranging from positive to negative to nonexistent. 1 Institutionalist scholars (e.g. Keohane, 1984) argue that institutions promote cooperation between member states by increasing information, decreasing uncertainty, enhancing legal liability, and raising the reputational stakes for reneging on agreements.
2 They also stress the active role that international organizations play in the conflict management process, serving as mediators or adjudicators to help member countries resolve international conflicts (e.g. Abbott and Snidal, 1998; Russett and Oneal, 2001) . International organizations may facilitate cooperation among member states passively (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006) , something long recognized in the international law literature. For example, if two countries recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), then the ability for both sides to take disputes to the ICJ may enhance the chances that they will reach agreements out of court (Bilder, 1998) . A similar process has been observed in the World Trade Organization and the European Court of Justice: the strong legal dispute mechanisms in these institutions deter countries from making frivolous claims (Allee, 2003; Burley and Mattli, 1993) . International organizations may also promote cooperation among members indirectly, by promoting democratization among members (Pevehouse, 2002) , which in turn strengthens interstate peace because democracies do not fight wars against other democracies (Russett and Oneal, 2001 ).
1 Cooperation is defined generally as policy coordination, or when two or more countries' policies become more compatible with each other and facilitate each other's goals (Keohane, 1984: 51-53) . Cooperation also refers to peaceful interactions (or the absence of militarized conflict) and compliance with the terms of international agreements. Institutions have been conceptualized both as formal agreements (e.g. IGOs) and more broadly as regimes, which are "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner, 1982: 186) ". In this paper, I adopt the more formalistic view of international institutions.
The counterpoint to these optimistic views of institutions as facilitators of interstate cooperation is articulated most clearly by realists (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1994-95) , who view international organizations as epiphenomenal. In other words, realists contend that institutions merely reflect power relationships in world politics, and as such, membership in IOs has no effect on states' foreign policy behavior. Countries may comply with the terms of international treaties simply because they require very little change in behavior (Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996) . International organizations may sometimes promote conflict among member states or increase the chances for conflict between member states and non-member states. These conflict promoting patterns of IOs have been described by scholars studying military alliances 3 , preferential trade agreements (which may promote economic conflict across trading blocs), and military interventions in domestic politics (e.g. NATO intervention in Kosovo).
The pessimistic view of institutions posed by realists has structured theoretical debates around the question of whether institutions matter, rather than when or how they matter. "Since the 1980s, work on international institutions has been defined for the most part by the demand that scholars respond to a realist agenda: to prove that institutions have a significant effect on state behavior…either institutions matter or they do not. Insufficient attention has been given to the mechanisms through which we might expect institutional effects to work" (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 742-743) . A variety of scholars have begun to explore these mechanisms more carefully, focusing on the design of international institutions.
Even among scholars who accept the important role international organizations play in promoting interstate cooperation, there is disagreement about the theoretical mechanisms or processes that best account for the positive correlation between shared IO memberships and peaceful/cooperative relationships (e.g. Russett and Oneal, 2001 , 2003) .
In this paper, I derive several hypotheses about the constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on member state behavior from existing theoretical arguments in the IR literature and evaluate these claims empirically using data on contentious issues from the Issue Correlates of War Project (Hensel, 2001; Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers, 2004) . Empirical analyses show that while shared IO memberships (frequency and duration) neither prevent the onset of new contentious issues nor promote more frequent peaceful settlement attempts, they do decrease the use of militarized force and produce more successful negotiation attempts. Disputants are much more likely to reach and comply with agreements to end contentious issue claims when they share more frequent and durable memberships in international organizations. The analyses provide evidence for both constraining and constitutive effects of IOs on member states' behavior, although the results are strongest for the institutionalist/rationalist hypotheses.
The Constraining Effects of International Organizations
Institutionalist (e.g., Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Martin, 1995) and rationalist (e.g. Koremenos et al, 2001; Boehmer et al, 2004 ) theories of international organizations treat state preferences as fixed and exogenous. Because states are rational egoists, they have incentives to defect from cooperative agreements and/or free-ride in the provision of international public goods.
Institutions (or regimes more broadly) help to mitigate these tendencies for free riding and defection in a variety of ways. First, international institutions establish patterns of legal liability or accountability. Institutions serve as quasi-agreements and "like contracts, help to organize relationships in mutually beneficial ways…Contracts, conventions, and quasi-agreements provide information and generate patterns of transaction costs: costs of reneging on commitments are increased, and the costs of operating within these frameworks are reduced." (Keohane, 1984: 89) Similarly, "other forces-such as transparency, reciprocity, accountability, and regime-mindedness-allow regimes to impose significant constraints on international behavior under the right conditions." (Mitchell, 1994:429) The second way in which institutions facilitate cooperation involves reducing transaction costs and thereby making it easier for states to negotiate agreements. The centralization and independence of IOs enhance their efficiency and reduce the costs of bargaining for member states (Abbott and Snidal, 1998) . Institutions transform single shot games to iterated games and lengthen the shadow of the future, reducing transaction costs of legitimate contracts and raising the costs of illegitimate ones. Institutions also provide regular forums for meetings and negotiations, and link various clusters of issues together, facilitating the arrangement of sidepayments (Keohane, 1984:90-91) .
Third, international institutions increase the flow of information among member states.
"Regimes may also include international organizations whose secretariats act not only as mediators but as providers of unbiased information that is made available, more or less equally to all members. By reducing asymmetries of information through a process of upgrading the general level of available information, international regimes reduce uncertainty." (Keohane, 1984: 94) Private information creates incentives for states to misrepresent their true interests in the bargaining process (Fearon, 1995) , something institutions can help to mitigate through their provision of objective information about each side's capabilities, resolve, and interests (Abbott and Snidal, 1998) .
Another way that institutions can improve the prospects for cooperation involves states' concern with their reputation. The general argument is that when states are acting in the context of international institutions (or regimes), they are more likely to comply with cooperative agreements out of consideration for their reputation in future bargaining situations. Keohane (1984: 94) , for example, contends that: "A government's reputation therefore becomes an important asset in persuading others to enter into agreements with it. International regimes help governments to assess others' reputations by providing standards of behavior against which performance can be measured, by linking these standards to specific issues, and by providing forums, often through international organizations, in which these evaluations can be made." Duffield (1992) makes a similar argument in his study of the size of conventional forces in NATO. Not only does compliance reinforce the tendency for other states to comply with the same agreement, it also "may increase the willingness of states to enter into further, mutually beneficial arrangements." (Duffield, 1992: 836) Reputation costs for noncompliance may be particularly acute when important regional or global institutions, such as the European Union, Organization of American States, or the United Nations, become directly involved in a dispute resolution process. Such institutions deal with a wide variety of issues, giving them leverage to provide greater linkages across issues (Keohane, 1984; Martin and Simmons, 1998) . Abbott and Snidal (1998: 26 ) make a similar point about
IOs: "They increase the prospect of continued interaction, often across issues, and generalize reputational effects of reneging across members of the organization." If these institutions are viewed with legitimacy by member states, the chances for compliance increase (Milner, 1993) .
Furthermore, non-compliance with an IO-based judgment, especially a binding judgment (through arbitration or adjudication), may call into question a state's respect for the international legal order and the rule of law.
Beyond reputation concerns, international institutions also offer other important advantages that can increase the likelihood of states striking and complying with international agreements. First, IOs can offer greater legitimacy in reaching an agreement than states serving as third party mediators, whose involvement and decisions are likely to be seen as more political and less legalistic in nature (Pevehouse, 2002) . Second, IOs may be convenient scapegoats and allow leaders to save face (Rovine, 1976) , especially when the settlement is politically unpopular at home (Abbott and Snidal, 1998: 22-23) or the disputing countries have otherwise cordial relations (Fischer, 1982) . 4 Third, guarantees by institutional third parties can be helpful for mitigating the security dilemma that arises in contentious dyads, increasing the likelihood that agreements will be carried out. For example, Walter (1997) develops a credible commitment theory of civil war resolution, arguing that negotiations succeed only when third parties are willing to verify and enforce demobilization. Finally, outside parties may pledge to uphold an IO-based decision by force, they may tie aid decisions to compliance, or they might withhold IO benefits, all of which raise the costs of non-compliance (Abbott and Snidal, 1998) .
Institutions can also help to resolve conflicts directly as third parties. This includes both facilitative intervention in the form of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and fact-finding, and binding intervention in the form of arbitration or adjudication (Abbott and Snidal, 1998) . 5 When such techniques are employed, the institution plays a much more active role in conflict settlement than simply increasing the flow of information or reducing transaction costs. Instead, the institution itself can be called upon to help resolve the contentious issue(s) in question, perhaps even through a binding settlement that both disputants agree in advance to accept.
As Keohane (1984: 88) arguing that IOs best promote cooperation between members when they have clear mandates for security, strong internal member cohesion, and strong institutional mechanisms for sanctioning and enforcement. Scholars have also emphasized the extent to which the design of various institutions adequately resolves both informational and distributional concerns (Krasner, 1991; Morrow, 1994; Martin and Simmons, 1998 H 1A (Constraining): As dyadic shared IO memberships increase, pairs of states will be more likely to attempt peaceful settlements to resolve contentious issues.
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H 1B (Constraining): As dyadic shared IO memberships increase, pairs of states will be more likely to reach and comply with peaceful agreements to resolve contentious issues.
H 1C (Constraining): As dyadic shared IO memberships increase, pairs of states will be less likely to employ militarized force to resolve contentious issues.
The Constitutive Effects of International Organizations
Constructivist theories of international organizations emphasize the constitutive effects of IOs, challenging a number of Institutionalist and Rationalist assumptions. First, IOs are not viewed as organizations that simply aggregate or reflect (median) member states' preferences.
IOs are depicted as organizations with complex bureaucracies, where bureaucrats can have agendas independent from member states and where multiple agendas and agencies are possible (Ness and Brechin, 1988; Finnemore, 1993; Barnett and Finnemore, 1999) . 7 Second, because entrepreneurs (individuals or groups) can capture the attention of IO bureaucrats, new ideas and policies can emerge in international organizations and member states (and their citizens) may be socialized to accept them. Third, the extent to which IO norms become internalized may depend on the distribution of power among groups inside the state and their agenda setting capabilities (Cortell and Davis, 1996; Haas, 1989; Checkel, 1999) . In this regard, state preferences are influenced both by internal and external political processes. Institutionalists assume that shared interests create the conditions for institutional formation, whereas constructivists focus on how
IOs produce new norms once established (Finnemore, 1993: 594) . 8 Schimmelfennig (2003: 70) emphasizes this relationship between IOs and state identities and interests:
Whereas rationalist institutionalism emphasizes the instrumental, efficiencyenhancing functions of international organizations in the service of state actors, sociological institutionalism sees them as autonomous and potentially powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing effects. International organizations are "community representatives" as well as community-building agencies…they do not simply regulate state behavior but shape state identities and interests. Barnett & Finnemore (1993) argue that IOs shape members' interests and identities because they "embody a form of authority, rational-legal authority, that modernity views as particularly legitimate and good" (p. 707). IOs present themselves as neutral, objective actors that serve others' interests, encouraging states to accept their authority and actions with legitimacy. This authority status allows IOs to engage in a number of activities that influence member states including classification of actors and actions, the fixing of meanings, and the diffusion of new norms (Barnett and Finnemore, 1993: 710) . In other words, IOs are able to engage in a process of collective legitimization (Claude, 1966) . However, this authority status also comes with a price for member states, as IOs often engage in pathological or dysfunctional behavior that goes against members' interests.
The socialization effects of IOs may extend to both member and non-member states.
Internally, IOs socialize member states by promoting democratization of member states (Pevehouse, 2002) , promoting economic liberalization, and encouraging members to adopt peaceful conflict management strategies (Mitchell 2002) . More broadly, "international organizations may…encourage states to expand their conception of the interests at stake, promoting more inclusive and longer-term thinking; shape general norms and principles of appropriate behavior; or encourage empathy and mutual identification among peoples" (Russett and Oneal, 2001: 37) . Thus IOs should produce a convergence in state behavior and interests over time, with the internal socialization effects having their strongest effects on the institutions' oldest members (Hooghe, 2005) . Schimmelfennig (2003) (Bilder, 1998) . IOs that emphasize peaceful conflict resolution techniques in their charter will socialize member states to be more open to peaceful settlement techniques and to view settlements reached through peaceful means with greater legitimacy (Mitchell, 2002) . It is also possible that such benefits will extend beyond IOs, creating systemic expectations about peaceful conflict management practices.
Much like the rationalist IO literature, constructivists have also identified a series of institutional design features that influence the process of IO socialization. Johnston (2001) identifies two key micro-processes of socialization: persuasion and social influence. (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006) .
The ICOW data is used to construct information at three points in the dyadic conflict process: 1) the onset of a new issue claim in a given year, 2) peaceful or militarized management attempts to settle an ongoing issue claim in a given claim dyad year, and 3) the success of peaceful settlement attempts with respect to whether claimants reach agreements and/or comply with their terms. Stage one requires identification of a set of dyads where an issue claim could potentially occur, something akin to politically relevant dyads in the study of militarized conflict (Lemke and Reed, 2001) . Cases identified in stage one focus only on the Western Hemisphere because this is the only region for which data collection on all three issues (territory, maritime, and river) is complete. (Small and Singer, 1982) , and include Austria-Hungary (1816 -1918 , China (1950-present) , France (1816 France ( -1940 France ( , 1945 , Germany (1816 Germany ( -1918 Germany ( , 1925 Germany ( -1945 Germany ( , 1991 , Great Britain (1816-present), Italy (1860 Italy ( -1943 , Japan (1895 Japan ( -1945 Japan ( , 1991 , Russia (1816 Russia ( -1917 Russia ( , 1922 , and the United States (1898-present). These coding rules produce a total of 39,442 dyads from 11 The coding of peaceful attempted settlements includes negotiations meant to settle part or all of issue under contention ("substantive" settlement attempts), negotiations over procedures for future settlement of the claim ("procedural" settlement attempts, such as a treaty submitting the claim to arbitration by a specific third party or an agreement to meet for new negotiations at some specific time), and negotiations over the use of the claimed area or river without attempting to settle the question of ownership ("functional" settlement attempts, such as a treaty of free navigation along a disputed river border). Any other types of negotiations (e.g., talks over a ceasefire to stop an ongoing crisis or war that do not include any functional or procedural elements beyond stopping the fighting) are excluded. The third stage focuses explicitly on peaceful attempts to settle contentious issue claims.
The unit of analysis is a peaceful settlement attempt, such as a mediation effort or bilateral talks.
Analyses focused on peaceful attempts are ideal for looking at the outcomes of interstate bargaining processes, and can help determine whether shared IO memberships influence the success of specific settlement attempts. There are a total of 1,444 peaceful attempts to settle 12 Some analyses are restricted temporally because I employ two IO measures based on recognition of compulsory jurisdiction in the Permanent Court of International Justice 14 There are numerous types of reservations for optional clause declarations including restrictions related to certain states (ratione personae), certain times of disputes (ratione temporis), divergent areas of international law (ratione materiae), general reservations (such as reciprocity), and others (Szafarz, 1993 The validity of this measure depends on an assumption that a member's support for an organization's norms increases as time in the organization increases (Hooghe, 2005: 867) . 
Empirical Analyses
I begin by examining the influence of shared IO memberships on the onset of new issue claims. Table 1 presents six models: Models 1A-1C capture issue claim onset with each of the three IO measures entered separately, while Models 2A-2C limit the issues at stake to territorial claims.
In general, we see that shared IO memberships have a positive and statistically significant effect on issue or territorial claim onset in five of the six models. Model 1A looks at the effect of joint ICJ acceptance, and reveals that the probability of claim onset is twice as great if both states recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ/ICJ. The substantive results for all models are reported in Table 4 , and we can see that the likelihood of issue claim onset increases from .0020
to .0045 when we turn on the joint ICJ dummy variable. A similar effect is observed for territorial claims, which are in general more salient and contentious. The probability of a new territorial claim is .0007 for two states that do not jointly accept ICJ jurisdiction, increasing to .0013 if both sides recognize the Court.
Length of commitment to the ICJ does not seem to alter this relationship; in Model 1B and Model 2B (Table 1) , joint ICJ time has a positive and significant effect on both issue claim and territorial claim onset. Moving from the mean to the maximum time raises the likelihood of issue claim onset from .0023 to .0085 and the probability of territorial claim onset from .0007 to .0027. Thus longer commitments to the PCIJ/ICJ make states more rather than less likely to initiate issue claims. These results seem to go against the expectations of the constitutive hypotheses, especially H 2A , which anticipated that increases in dyadic shared time in IOs would 15 This data set is available at <http://data.icow.org>, including documentation that lists the excerpts of the treaty or charter that call for the pacific settlement of disputes. 16 I also plan to create joint time measures for the MTOPS data but this is a time consuming task because the data are coded only at the monadic level. 17 While the results reported below are derived from bivariate models, each of the empirical models was estimated with a series of control variables employed in other ICOW analyses. In the future, I plan to add better information about the robustness of the bivariate results by reporting the range of estimated parameters for the key theoretical variables across all estimated models.
reduce the likelihood of new issue claims. Furthermore, these results hold when removing cases involving the United States and cases involving any major powers. Thus minor powers seem to exhibit the same tendencies to initiate more issue claims when they are committed to the World Court and their length of commitment increases.
The results for joint IO memberships more broadly (Model 1C and 2C) are mixed, with joint IO memberships significantly increasing the chances for issue claims, but having no effect on territorial claims. 18 Moving from the mean IO membership value to the maximum, we see an increase in the probability of claim onset from .0022 to .0090. All of these substantive effects are fairly small, which is not surprising given the rareness of the dependent variable. Yet, the results reported in Table 1 are fairly consistent when control variables for regime type, relative power, rivalry status, alliance ties, distance, and foreign policy similarity are added. In short, shared and longer IO commitments have not prevented the initiation of new issue claims, at least in the Western Hemisphere over the past 80 years. show that joint ICJ acceptance, joint ICJ time, and joint IO memberships have negative and significant effects on the likelihood that peaceful settlement attempts are employed in a given year (this includes bilateral and third party efforts). Recognition of the ICJ by both claimants reduces the probability of peaceful settlement attempts from .1581 to .1207. Increasing shared ICJ time from its minimum to maximum moves the likelihood of peaceful attempts from .1556 to .0922, while shared IO memberships in peace promoting institutions reduces the peaceful 18 These analyses employ the Correlates of War data on IGOs, which accounts for the loss of cases. Prior to World War II, COW coded information on IGOs at five-year intervals only. The next version of this paper will replace this measure with a dyadic count of shared membership in MTOPS institutions. It will also add a measure for shared IO time in MTOPS institutions, which will provide an alternative operationalization for the constitutive effect. 19 For each year of an ongoing issue claim, we identify all militarized disputes where the claimants are on opposing sides, using version 3.02 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set (Ghosn and Palmer 2003) . We then look through historical sources to determine whether the militarized dispute in question was related directly to the territorial, maritime, or river claim in question; this allows us to capture more effectively whether the parties resorted to force explicitly over the issue, removing MIDs over other issues. However, these results are driven primarily by the decision to include both bilateral and third party settlements in the measure of peaceful settlement attempts. If we separate bilateral and third party peaceful settlement attempts, we find that a higher number of shared IO memberships in peace promoting institutions significantly increases the chances for third party settlement attempts, while significantly decreasing the chances for bilateral negotiations (Kadera and Mitchell, 2005; Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi, 2006) . Thus IO memberships do promote more community based methods for resolving conflicts, but they do not necessarily enhance all forms of peaceful settlement.
20 Table 2 , Models 2A-2C present results for militarized disputes over the issues at stake, using again the claim dyad year as the unit of analysis. Here we find mixed results. Joint recognition of PCIJ/ICJ compulsory jurisdiction significantly decreases the probability of militarized conflict (.0384 to .0185). Similarly, the longer the shared commitment to the PCIJ/ICJ in the dyad, the less likely the two states are to resort to force. As we move from the minimum to the maximum value for joint ICJ time, the probability of militarized confrontation drops from .0352 to .0170. Interestingly, though, the results for joint IO memberships more broadly (Model 2C) show a positive and significant effect of IO memberships on militarized force, contrary to both the constraining (H 1C ) and constitutive (H 2D ) hypotheses. These results are consistent with Hensel's (2001) findings for a positive effect of shared institutions (also using the MTOPS data) on militarized disputes using a sample of territorial claims in the Western Commitment to the ICJ helps produce more efficient interstate bargaining, and yet the duration of that commitment also matters as well. States that have recognized compulsory jurisdiction for longer periods of time are better able to strike peaceful accords. The broader measure for joint IO memberships in Model 1C, Table 3 is positive as expected, but fails to reach statistical significance at the .90 level. These results are similar to those reported in Kadera and Mitchell (2005) and Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi (2006) , where joint institutions have no significant effect on agreements.
Models 2A-2C in Table 3 report results for compliance with agreements struck.
Compliance is coded positively when both sides carry out the terms of the agreement within five years (see Mitchell and Hensel 2006) . Joint ICJ acceptance, joint ICJ time, and joint IO memberships all have positive and significant effects on compliance rates. Joint ICJ acceptance increases the probability of compliance from .7467 to .8570, while joint ICJ time has a strong effect as well, raising the probability from .7379 to .9016 as we move from the minimum to the maximum value. The results for joint IO memberships are also substantial, increasing the probability of compliance from .6887 to .9071 when we increase the measure from its minimum to its maximum. These results support the constraining hypothesis (H 1B ), suggesting perhaps (Mitchell and Hensel, 2006) . In short, even when restricting analyses to IOs that promote peaceful conflict management techniques in their charters, we observe a great deal of variance in the adoption of peaceful management strategies and their success. One possible explanation for this variance lies in the heterogeneity of interests represented in the peace-promoting IOs analyzed in this paper. Many are very general global or regional organizations and thus their members differ from each other on a variety of dimensions. It would be interesting to code more specific information about the design of these institutions based both on their charters and on various characteristics of member states (both at formation and over time). It would also be useful to expand our coding of PCIJ and ICJ jurisdiction, especially to include information about jurisdiction that stems from compromissory clauses in bilateral or multilateral treaties (Powell and Mitchell, 2006) . Recent work on IOs as social networks may also give us better leverage for capturing heterogeneity of members' preferences and tracking how these evolve over time (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006 This region is characterized both by a great deal of interstate contention and by a great deal of regional institutionalization. For example, all but one land border in the region has been contested in the past two hundred years (Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers, 2006) . Whether the existence of these contentious issue claims spurred states to create organizations is debatable and the evidence in this paper does not yet allow us to answer this potential critique. However, comparative tests of constraining and constitutive hypotheses are promising for identifying the mechanisms of the shared IO-cooperation relationship and for uncovering which institutional features best promote cooperative interactions. 
